

10/10
B61A-8480

LE

Chief of Station, Germany

Chief of Staff, Bonn

INFO: EE

Operational/Liaison

Memorandum of Conversation with GLODKE (29 March 1956)

1. A pre-arranged meeting was held with Dr. GLODKE in his office at 1700 hours on Thursday, 29 March 1956. This was my first talk with GLODKE since my return from Washington, and I was anxious to see him because his secretary had informed me that he was departing on Saturday, 31 March, with his family for a vacation in Oberndorf, Bavaria, and would not be returning until 20 April.

2. Shortly before I went into the main office, Chancellor Adenauer called through on the telephone to GLODKE and talked to him for almost five minutes. GLODKE then welcomed me into his inner office and excused himself that he must first go ahead with a matter on which Adenauer had just called him. He then called the house lawyer in the Bundeskanzleramt and asked him to handle the matter which had just been referred to him by the Chancellor. (The lawyer's name was not mentioned; their conversation was on the familiar "Du" basis). GLODKE instructed him to handle the letter from Lawyer von Berg which threatened a suit of the Chancellor by Sir Oswald Mosley over the Haumann affair. (This has been reported in ZON-452). GLODKE instructed the lawyer to send a denial to the lawyer based on the press conference minutes which prove that the Chancellor had not actually named Mosley and de Grelle as backing Haumann. GLODKE told the lawyer that the real reason was that Haumann was attempting to sue former British High Commissioner Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick and was trying to get added fuel for his case by having Mosley sue the Chancellor.

3. I told GLODKE that from my Washington trip I brought him greetings from ASCHAH. I explained that there was great interest in our own election in the United States, and considerable interest in the new Soviet course. I reminded him of our 3 February conversation with [] on cold war objectives and methods, and pointed out that many psychological warfare issues were now up for discussion, including [] beliefs, [] radio, and the Berlin organizations. We had noticed a tendency for the German Foreign Office, and in particular Herr Meissner, to take a soft position on these matters. On the part of KUBARK, and also specifically on the part of Minister Dowling, I wanted to point out that we would regret such soft positions on the part of the German Government because--

a. This would create a bad impression on the American public, especially during an election year, and

10/10
GLODKE - 201
324-2-1

COPY
DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2006

DUPLICATE COPY

b. Caving in on these issues now would just bring more pressure and blackmail, not only from the Soviets but from the GDR.

GLOBKE said he agreed completely that a firm line should be maintained and, to insure that this line was followed by all ministries, he would put this item on the agenda of the first meeting of the State Secretaries' conference after his return on 20 April. (The gist of this conversation was reported by cable ECHN 3935).

4. I went on to say that we might possibly do even more rather than less now in cold war matters. In this respect we wish to have his opinion and approval of the question of a direct contact with ARK, with the intention of examining the possibility of providing some assistance and support. He thought this was a good idea and asked if we had discussed it with former [] []. He was assured that we had discussed it with [] [] and had told him that we would obtain GLOEKE's approval for proceeding. GLOBKE said that we should by all means go right ahead with this idea.

5. It was mentioned to him that we were working on a process of formalizing the record of the Agreements reached last summer in the Gumbel Committee concerning the Secret Memoranda of Understanding. Mr. Peter Hope had spoken to him about this, and we were in general agreement with the position taken by Mr. Hope. It is hoped to complete this action in the near future and to tie up the agreements under the Bonn Conventions. It would still, however, be necessary to have certain clauses in the NATO Status of Forces Agreements to protect intelligence and security interests. GLOEKE indicated general agreement but did not seem to be up to date on the details of this subject as it was dropped. I mentioned only that cooperation at the technical level would go ahead and pointed out to him that the attraction of commissions in the new army might seriously weaken the JfV and possibly even the KPD by robbing them of competent individuals who might prefer army careers to their present situations, particularly if they did not have permanent civil service status. He said that this problem had been recognized, and that they were thinking about it.

6. To fulfill a requirement of Strategic Division GLOBKE was next asked about the banning of the KPD. (This has been reported in ECHN 450). He explained that the executive side of the government had very little room for maneuver in this matter. The publication of the court decision would automatically start the police and prosecuting attorneys' mechanisms which must carry out the court decision. As a matter of practical politics the prohibition would do the coalition very little good since people who voted for the KPD might now be expected to vote for the SP. In the sphere of foreign politics it was not very practical either because the government could not adjust the timing to give a rebuke to the Soviets when needed, or to reaffirm their Western affiliation when it was questioned.

7. The conversation was interrupted by two telephone conversations. One, which resulted in GLOBKE's checking on the Chancellor's schedule, brought out the fact that the Bohr visit to Germany would be on 12-15 July. After this conversation I asked GLOBKE if Bulganin and Kruschev were going to visit Germany. He replied, "Only if they invite themselves." In another

AVAILABLE COPY

SECRET

telephone call, which interrupted the conversation, GLOME pointed out to an unidentified caller that pains should be taken to see that the ministers who had been forced out in North Rhine-Westphalia and who had been ministers for some time should receive the normal description (Ruhmever-leistung) that retiring ministers normally receive. The new provincial government would obviously not put them in for this honor, but something should be done to see that they were recognized.

8. To conclude the conversation I asked GLOME if he had any special problems. He brought up again the question of the Chancellor's interest in a newspaper. This has been reported in a separate cable.

9 April 1956

Distribution:
3-COS
2-NS

SECRET

UNAVAILABLE COPY

32-2-294